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Identification of Image Operations Based on
Steganalytic Features
Haodong Li, Weiqi Luo, Xiaoqing Qiu, Jiwu Huang
Abstract—Image forensics have attracted wide attention during
the past decade. Though many forensic methods have been
proposed to identify image forgeries, most of them are targeted
ones, since their proposed features are highly dependent on the
image operation under investigation. The performance of the
well-designed features for detecting the targeted operation usually
degrades significantly for other operations. On the other hand,
a wise attacker can perform anti-forensics to fool the existing
forensic methods, making countering anti-forensics become an
urgent need. In this paper, we try to find a universal feature
to detect various image processing and anti-forensic operations.
Based on our extensive experiments and analysis, we find that
any image processing/anti-forensic operations would inevitably
modify many image pixels. This would change some inherent
statistics within original images, which is similar to the case
of steganography. Therefore, we model image processing/anti-
forensic operations as steganography problems, and propose
a detection strategy by applying steganalytic features. With
some advanced steganalytic features, we are able to detect
various image operations and further identify their types. In
our experiments, we have tested several steganalytic features on
11 different kinds of typical image processing operations and 4
kinds of anti-forensic operations. The experimental results have
shown that the proposed strategy significantly outperforms the
existing forensic methods in both effectiveness and universality.
Index Terms—Image Operation Detection, Countering Anti-
forensics, Steganalysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of image processing tech-
niques, digital images can be easily modified without leaving
any perceptible artifacts. Digital image forgeries are now
abused in our daily life, leading to potential serious moral,
ethical, and legal consequences. Therefore, image forensics
[1] have attracted increasing attention. Up to now, many
forensic methods have been proposed. The existing forensic
methods assume that there are some inherent statistics within
original natural images. Such statistics vary according to
different image sources, and they would change after different
operations. By gathering features to characterize the image
generation pipeline, one can determine the source camera [2]
or identifying the camera model [3] for a given image. By
analyzing the special artifacts left by a certain image operation,
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it is possible to find out the tampered images. For instance,
identifying the JPEG compression history [4], [5], [6], [7],
revealing contrast enhancement [8], [9], resampling [10], [11],
[12] and median filtering [13], [14], [15], [16], exposing
image splicing [17], [18], [19], and so on. The employed
features in most of existing methods, however, are usually
specially designed for only one type of operation, and thus they
are difficult to be generalized for detecting other operations.
Besides, many methods assume that the suspected image has
been processed either by a specific operation or not, which
means that just a binary classification is considered. However,
such an assumption seems not very reasonable in practice,
since the previous operations for a given suspected image are
usually known. In such a case, we can not decide which pre-
designed binary classifier should be applied.
Another serious issue that would affect the performances
of the existing forensic methods is the presence of anti-
forensics[20]. In order to fool the existing forensic methods,
a wise attacker can perform some anti-forensic operations to
weaken the artifacts left by tampering or confuse the inherent
statistics within original images. So far, there have been several
attempts to carry out anti-forensics against forensic detection,
such as [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26]. At this point, it
is urgent to expose the anti-forensically altered images. In
[27], [28], Valenzise et al. proposed a method to detect anti-
forensics of JPEG compression [21] by measuring image
quality with the total variation. In [29], the authors presented
two detectors to reveal the JPEG anti-forensic operation.
Cao et al. [30] introduced a semi-nonintrusive approach to
detect anti-forensics of resampling [25] through analyzing the
output of resampling software with some specifically designed
images. Zeng et al. [31] identified anti-forensics of median
filtering [26] via detecting the peaks in Fourier transform
domain for the ratio of horizontal pixel differences with zero
values. Similar to the targeted forensic methods that aim at
detecting a certain operation, though the counter anti-forensic
methods can effectively expose the resulting images after some
anti-forensic operations, their applicability is still limited since
each of them just focuses on a specific anti-forensic operation.
In our previous work [32], we employed JPEG stegan-
alytic features [33] to detect JPEG anti-forensic operation
[21]. Though only anti-forensics of JPEG compression was
considered, it shows the possibility of detecting anti-forensics
with some steganalytic features. In the subsequent work [34],
we use steganalytic features to detect image splicing and some
common image operations, and further identify the types of
them. As the extension of our previous works, this paper
considers the task of identifying both various image processing
2and anti-forensic operations, and tries to find a universal
feature to deal with such problem. Via analyzing various image
operations (in this paper, image operations limit common
image processing and most existing anti-forensic operations),
we find that any operation would modify many pixel values
and thus inevitably destroy some inherent statistics of orig-
inal images, which is similar to the process of data hiding.
Via modeling image forensics as a steganalytic problem, we
present a strategy to identify various image operations with
some steganalytic features. Compared with [32] and [34], the
main differences and extensions in this paper are as follows.
First, instead of just presenting some preliminary experimental
results in our previous works, we give a detailed comparison
between image operations and steganography to make the
motivation and the presented idea more clear, and further study
the feasibility on using steganalytic features to detect various
image operations (refer to Section II). Second, more image
operations are analyzed and evaluated in our experiments,
including 11 kinds of typical image processing operations
and 4 kinds of existing anti-forensic methods. The extensive
experimental results have shown that the proposed strategy
works much better than the existing forensic methods in both
effectiveness and universality (refer to Section IV).
Compared with previous arts about forensics and/or detect-
ing anti-forensics, this paper has some differences and new
insights for forensics as follows:
• Unlike those targeted methods that aim at detecting a
specific operation (e.g., [6], [9], [11], [27]), we need
not to carefully analyze the specific traces left by the
operation under investigation. Instead, we use exactly the
same features for detecting various different operations,
which means that the steganalytic features employed in
this paper can be regarded as universal ones.
• Though a few literatures such as [17], [20] have discussed
the similarities between steganalysis and forensics, they
just provide some qualitative analysis. In this paper, we
further demonstrate the correlations between steganalysis
and forensics with detailed examples and extensive quan-
titative analysis (refer to Section II-B), and deeply assess
the suitability of that applying steganalytic features for
forensic detection (refer to Section II-C).
• It is noted that applying steganalytic features in forensics
is not new, a few prior works have used some steganalytic
features or extracted features analogous to steganalysis.
For instance, SPAM (subtractive pixel adjacency matrix)
[35] was used in [13] for median filtering detection, fea-
tures based on rotation invariant local binary pattern [36]
were respectively used in [37], [38] for camera model
detection and image sharpening detection; SRM (spatial
rich model) [39] was used in [40] for detecting image
splicing. However, all of them just focus on detecting
one specific operation. Unlike the previous works, we
systematically study whether the advanced steganalytic
features can be universally used for detecting various
image operations, and demonstrate their universality and
effectiveness with extensive experiments. Furthermore,
we first try to identify the type of operation via multiple
1st-order correlations
2nd-order correlations
(a) Spatial correlations
Inter-block correlations
Intra-block correlations
(b) Frequency correlations
Fig. 1. Illustrations of the correlations of local image regions in spatial
domain and DCT frequency domain.
classification (refer to Section III-B and IV-A2), which is
never considered before yet very important in practice.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II analyzes the commons of various image operations from
the view of steganalysis, and proposes a strategy to detect
different operations via applying steganalytic features. Section
III presents the implementation of the proposed detection
strategy, including feature selection and design of classifiers.
Section IV shows the experimental results and discussions.
Finally, the concluding remarks are given in Section V.
II. ANALYSIS ON IMAGE PROCESSING AND
ANTI-FORENSIC OPERATIONS
In this section, we firstly analyze the commons of various
image processing operations and existing anti-forensic opera-
tions, and then introduce a strategy for detecting them from
the view of steganalysis.
A. Pixel Modification in Various Image Operations
To seek a universal feature set for detecting various image
operations, we mean to obtain a feature set that can capture the
artifacts left by various operations rather than a specific one
that only works for a certain operation. Based on our extensive
experiments and analysis, we found that lots of pixel values
would be modified after various operations, as shown in Table
I (here we do not consider the operations that are relevant to
resampling due to lack of synchronization). It is observed that
more than 70% pixel values are modified. Besides, the quality
of the resulting images also degrades significantly due to the
modifications. All the average PSNR (Peak Signal-to-Noise
Ratio) of the resulting images relative to their original versions
are lower than 44 dB. Especially, the average PSNR for the
contrast enhancement operations including Gamma correction
and histogram equalization drops to about 16 dB.
3TABLE I
THE AVERAGE MODIFICATION RATIOS AND PSNR AFTER PERFORMING VARIOUS OPERATIONS ON 10,000 IMAGES IN BOSS BASE IMAGE DATABASE
WITH DIFFERENT PARAMETERS (PLEASE REFER TO TABLE III FOR MORE DETAILS). “AF” AND “CE” DENOTE “ANTI-FORENSICS” AND “CONTRAST
ENHANCEMENT”, RESPECTIVELY.
Operation Modification PSNR
Contrast enhancement 99.17% 16.06 dB
Image processing Sharpening 73.91% 36.77 dB
operations Spatial Filtering 79.11% 34.45 dB
Lossy compression 68.33% 43.90 dB
JPEG AF Dither [21]
1 81.56% 39.49 dB
Anti-forensic Dither & deblocking [21] 85.87% 35.10 dB
operations CE AF Cao’s method [23] 99.37% 20.20 dBKwok’s method [24] 99.37% 20.21 dB
Median filtering AF [26] 86.35% 34.11 dB
original
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Fig. 2. Image processing operations and anti-forensic operations vs. steganography.
As we know, the adjacent pixel values and frequency
coefficients within an original natural image are highly de-
pendent, as illustrated in Fig. 1 (a) and (b). It is expected
that once an image pixel is modified, it would inevitably
affect the relationship with its neighbors. Thus such inherent
correlations are very difficult to be well preserved after pixel
modifications especially when the quantity of modified pixels
are large. Usually, the more pixels are changed, the easier
the resulting images can be detected. Furthermore, various
image operations modify the pixels within an original image
in different manners and/or strengths, which means that they
would destroy the inherent correlations among adjacent pixels
in different degrees. By properly measuring such correlations,
it is possible to distinguish the manipulated images from the
original natural ones, and further identify the type of various
operations.
B. Various Image Operations vs. Steganography
Based on previous observations in Subsection II-A, vari-
ous image operations would modify many image pixels and
destroy the inherent correlations among adjacent pixels in
different degrees. Thus how to model the correlations in
natural images is the key issue for detecting various image
operations. Fortunately, many useful statistical models in the
field of steganalysis can be adopted due to some similarities
between steganography and various image operations.
1The anti-forensic method proposed in [21] consists of two steps, i.e.,
adding dithers to conceal the quantization artifacts, and subsequently applying
deblocking to remove the blocking artifacts. These two operations are denoted
as “dither” and “dither & deblocking”, respectively.
As illustrated in Fig. 2, both image processing and anti-
forensic operations are similar to the process of data em-
bedding in steganography, since they all have to modify
some pixel values in original (cover) images. As described
previously, pixel modifications would destroy the inherent
correlations among adjacent pixels within the image. In order
to detect the pixel modifications in steganography, many
steganalytic features have been proposed via modeling such in-
herent properties. These features are usually effective even for
relatively low modification rates. For example, the literature
[39] has shown the effectiveness when the modification rate is
around 9% (0.40 bpp for WOW [41]). Therefore, we are won-
dering whether the steganalytic features can be also effective
for identifying image processing and anti-forensic operations,
which modify original images in a much more severe way. In
the following, we will provide some quantitative analysis to
show the feasibility on applying steganalytic features in image
forensics.
It is well known that there are several important factors that
would significantly affect the detectability of hidden data in
steganography. The first one is the location of the modified
pixels. The recent literatures [41], [43], [42] have shown that
compared to smooth regions in an image, textural regions are
more suitable for hiding data since they are difficult to be
modeled, and our human eyes are insensitive to the modi-
fications in these regions. The second factor is the quantity
and intensity of modified pixels. Based on previous studies,
we know that the larger the quantity and/or intensity, the
easier the stego images can be detected. To compare image
operations and steganography in both factors, we illustrate the
modifications of the resulting images after performing some
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Fig. 3. Illustration of the modification areas. (a) The original image. (b) Absolute differences of the stego image with WOW [41] at a high embedding rate of
0.4bpp. (c) Absolute differences of the modified image with JPEG compression (QF=90). (d) Absolute differences of the modified image with anti-forensics
of JPEG compression (Method [21], QF=90). (e) Absolute differences of the modified image with median filtering (filter size 3×3). (f) Absolute differences
of the modified image with anti-forensics of median filtering (Method [26], filter size 3×3, B = 4, T = 4). The scale bar on the right shows the degrees of
(b)-(f). The ratios of non-zero values (i.e. the modification rates) for (b)-(f) are 8.45%, 77.07%, 93.60%, 68.39%, 88.70%, respectively. The maximum value
of absolute differences for (b)-(f) are 1, 17, 21, 108, 109, respectively.
TABLE II
COMPARISON BETWEEN STEGANOGRAPHY AND ANTI-FORENSICS EVALUATED ON 10,000 IMAGES IN BOSS BASE IMAGE DATABASE
Modern adaptive steganography Image processing and anti-forensics operations
Modified Mainly located at the Both textural and smooth
regions textural/noisy regions regions are changed
Modification
±1
The absolute magnitudes are
magnitude usually much greater than 1in all existing techniques
Modification WOW[41] - around 8.93% Larger than 68% on average
rate HUGO[42] - around 10.26% (refer to Table I)(high embedding rate: 0.4bpp)
image operations and steganography in Fig. 3. It is observed
that image operations would modify both the smooth regions
and the textural regions, and much more pixels are changed
compared to steganography. What is more, the modification
intensity for image operations is also much greater, please
refer to the gray levels of the difference images as shown in
Fig. 3 (b)-(f).
To further provide more convincing evidences about the
image operations and steganography, we evaluate 10,000 im-
ages from Boss Base v1.01 [44] and summarize the results
on the above two factors in Table II. It is observed in Table
IIthat image operations would modify images in a much more
serious manner compared to the steganography. Based on the
above experiments and analysis, therefore, it is expected that
some advanced statistical features used in steganalysis are
suitable and easy for detecting various image operations.
C. Visualizing the Pixel Differences
In this subsection, we will use a simple steganalytic feature
(i.e. the joint probability of the backward and forward differ-
ences of the image pixels) to describe the correlations among
adjacent pixels, and illustrate that various image operations
would change such a simple feature in different manners
and/or degrees.
For an image I, let I(i, j) be the pixel value in the ith row
and the jth column. Then its horizontal backward and forward
differences can be respectively written as
db(i, j) = I(i, j)− I(i, j − 1)
df (i, j) = I(i, j)− I(i, j + 1)
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Fig. 4. The average joint probability P (x, y). (a) Original image. (b) Gamma correction. (c) Histogram equalization. (d) Sharpening. (e) Mean filtering. (f)
Gaussian filtering. (g) Wiener filtering. (h) Median filtering. (i) Scaling. (j) Rotation. (k) JPEG compression. (l) JPEG 2000 compression. (m)(n) Anti-forensics
of JPEG compression with “dither” and “dither & deblocking”, respectively. (o)(p) Anti-forensics of contrast enhancement with Cao’s and Kwok’s methods,
respectively. (q)(r)(s) Anti-forensics of resizing with “median”, “edge”, “dual”3 , respectively. (t)(u)(v) Anti-forensics of rotation with “median”, “edge”, “dual”,
respectively. (w) Anti-forensics of median filtering. Refer to Table III for the details of each operations.
where db(i, j), db(i, j) ∈ {−255, . . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . . , 255}.
Please note that the above two differences have two im-
portant properties. First, if a pixel I(i, j) locates at smooth
areas, the corresponding db(i, j) and df (i, j) are usually with
small values, while db(i, j) and df (i, j) become large for the
pixels located at textural areas. Second, a pixel I(i, j) with
3Three anti-forensic operations were proposed in [25], where the first one
(denoted as “median”) was based on median filtering, and the second one
(denoted as “edge”) was based on geometric distortion with edge modulation,
while the last one (denoted as “dual”) was a dual path approach that consisted
of the first two operations.
df (i, j)× df (i, j) > 0 is a local minimum/maximum pixel in
the horizontal direction, which can be regarded as an impulse
noise. In order to show the correlations among the pixel I(i, j)
and its adjacent pixels, we consider the joint probability of
horizontal backward and forward differences as follows
P (x, y) = Pr(db(i, j) = x, df (i, j) = y)
where x, y ∈ {−255, . . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . . , 255}.
In Fig. 4, we illustrate the average joint probability P (x, y)
for 10,000 original images from BossBase v1.01 and their
modified versions with various image operations. It is observed
6 k possible
operations
(k+1) kinds of
training images
Feature
extraction
A testing image
Steganalytic
feature
(k+1)-class
classifier
Feature
extraction Steganalytic
feature
Decision
result
Natural
images
Training stage
Testing stage
Fig. 5. The diagram of proposed strategy
from Fig. 4 that the “shape” of joint probability for original
images (i.e. Fig. 4(a)) would become more or less different
after various image operations (see Fig. 4(b)-(w)), indicating
that there are some changes in the correlation measured by the
joint probability P (x, y). Furthermore, the “shapes” of joint
probability for some image operations also differ from each
other. Specifically, we can clearly observe that:
• For some spatial enhancement operations, such as his-
togram equalization (i.e. Fig. 4(c)) and sharpening (i.e.
Fig. 4(d)), they will obviously enhance the high fre-
quency components in an image, resulting in the values
of P (x, y) increase for large (x, y). Similarly, Gamma
correction (i.e. Fig. 4(b)) and its corresponding anti-
forensic operations (i.e. Fig. 4(o) and (p)) also enlarge
the values of P (x, y) located at large (x, y), though the
degrees are less than those of histogram equalization and
sharpening.
• Considering some spatial filtering with low-pass property,
such as mean filtering (i.e. Fig. 4(e)), Gaussian filtering
(i.e. Fig. 4(f)), and Wiener filtering (i.e. Fig. 4(g)), the
values of P (x, y) for large (x, y) (which represent high
frequency components) become relatively smaller, for the
reason that the filtering operations tend to remove the
noises and smooth the textural regions within an image.
Especially, it is observed that the P (x, y) with non-zero
values are highly concentrated in the center (i.e. (x, y) =
(0, 0)) in Fig. 4(e) and Fig. 4(f).
• In Fig. 4(h), (n), (q), (t) and (w), the values of P (x, y)
in the 1st quadrant and the 3rd quadrant become much
smaller compared to the original one (i.e. Fig. 4(a)),
indicating that most local minimum/maximum pixels are
removed after applying the corresponding operations. The
reason is that all the corresponding operations involve
median filtering, which would significantly suppress the
impulse noises in an original image.
• The image resampling operations including scaling and
rotation need to use interpolation to produce new pixels.
Due to the low-pass nature of interpolation, the high
frequency components within the original image are
expected to be suppressed. It can be observed in Fig. 4 (i)
and (j) that the values of P (x, y) for large (x, y) indeed
decrease. Moreover, it is noted that the shapes of Fig.
4(i) and (j) differ from those of Fig. 4 (e), (f) and (g),
though both resampling and spatial filtering mentioned
above have low-pass properties.
Overall, the above observations have validated that image
operations would inevitably change the joint probability of
difference between two adjacent pixels in original images, and
their manners and/or degrees are usually different. Therefore,
the resulting joint probabilities for some image operations
become quite different from each other, which means that even
such a simple feature may be helpful for exposing original
images from the modified ones, and it can be further used for
identifying some types of image operations.
Please note that the advanced steganalytic features such
as SPAM [35], SRM [39], and LBP (local binary pattern)
[45] applied more complicated features for better measuring
the inherent correlations among adjacent pixels in original
images, and they usually achieve much better detection per-
formances. However, these features are too sophisticated and
high dimensional to show them intuitively in a figure. Thus we
just illustrate the joint probability of two adjacent differences
in the horizontal direction for display purpose. Based on
above observations and analysis, it is expected that advanced
steganalytic features are very promising for detecting various
image operations.
III. THE PROPOSED STRATEGY
In this section, we will describe the implementation of the
proposed strategy. The proposed strategy consists of training
and testing stages as illustrated in Fig. 5. Compared to conven-
tional forensic methods, the main difference in the proposed
strategy is to analyze and introduce some proper steganalytic
features in image forensics rather than considering some
special artifacts like that in existing methods. Besides, the
multiple classification forensic problem is firstly considered,
i.e. the case of k > 1.
A. Feature Selection and Analysis
It is well known that feature selection plays a very important
role in various classification algorithms. Up to now, lots of
steganalytic methods have been proposed. It is known that the
steganalytic methods can be divided into two different types,
i.e. targeted and universal methods [46]. Targeted steganalytic
methods are mainly based on some special artifacts introduced
by the targeted steganography. For example, based on the
structural asymmetry of LSB (least significant bit) replacement
7TABLE III
THE TYPES OF IMAGE PROCESSING OPERATIONS AND THEIR PARAMETERS USED IN THE EXPERIMENTS.
Type Parameters
Spatial Gamma Correction (GC) γ: 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2.0
enhancement Histogram Equalization (HE) -Unsharp Masking sharpening (UM) σ: 0.5 ∼ 1.5, λ: 0.5 ∼ 1.5
Mean Filtering (MeanF) hsize: 3× 3, 5× 5, 7× 7
Spatial Gaussian Filtering (GF) hsize: 3× 3, 5× 5, 7× 7; σ: 0.8 ∼ 1.6
filtering Median Filtering (MedF) hsize: 3× 3, 5× 5, 7× 7
Wiener Filtering (WF) hsize: 3× 3, 5× 5, 7× 7
Resampling Scaling (Sca)
up-sampling: 1, 3, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 (%)
down-sampling: 1, 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45 (%)
Rotation (Rot) degree: 1, 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45 (◦)
Lossy JPEG quality factor: 75 ∼ 99
compression JPEG 2000 (JP2) compression ratio: 2.0 ∼ 8.0
algorithm (which never decreases even pixels and increases
odd pixels), the Chi-squared attack [47] and regular/singular
groups analysis [48] can effectively detect LSB replacement
even at a low embedding rate, e.g. less than 0.05 bpp. However,
these methods will totally fail to detect other steganography
(as well as other image operations) such as LSB matching
which does not introduce the structural asymmetry at all.
Therefore, targeted steganalytic features are not considered
in the proposed strategy. Unlike the targeted steganalytic
methods, universal steganalytic methods (such as SRM [39]
and LBP [45]) try to model some inherent statistical properties
within natural images. Usually, these universal steganalytic
features are generated by computing the statistics on a set of
residuals of the given image, while the residuals are created
by filtering the image with different masks which cover a pixel
and its several neighbors. It is noted that different filter masks
try to catch different types of correlations among adjacent
pixels, hence the resulting features can represent different
statistical properties. Once some pixels within an original
image are modified, such features would changed inevitably.
Therefore, the universal steganalytic features can be adopted
in the proposed strategy.
B. The Methodology of Classification
After the features are selected, we can perform classification
with the supervised learning scheme as illustrated in Fig. 5.
Assume that the number of possible image processing and/or
anti-forensic operations is k (k ≥ 1) for a given testing image,
we need to design a (k+1)-class (including the class of original
images) classifier. Please note that when k = 1, it is a similar
case with the existing forensic works, i.e., determining whether
a given image has been modified with a specific operation.
Thus a binary classifier is needed in such a case. When k > 1,
we adopt the pairwise coupling strategy [49] to train a multi-
class classifier. Specifically, for all the (k+1) classes labeled
with integers {1, 2, . . . , k + 1}, we select each possible pair
of class i and class j (i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k + 1}, and i 6= j) to
train a binary classifier respectively, and totally obtain N =
k× (k+1)/2 classifiers, each of which outputs a label either
be i or j for an input feature. For a testing image, hence, we
feed its features to all the N classifiers and obtain N class
labels. Finally we choose the most frequently occurring label
as the predicted class label of this testing image.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In the experiments, 10,000 raw images were downloaded
from the Boss Base v1.01 [44]. These images were firstly
converted into gray scale bitmaps, and then a center region
with size of 1024 × 1024 was cropped for each image,
and finally like the pre-operations in [25], [50], all selected
segments were down-sampled with a factor 2 to remove the
artifacts of demosaicing introduced by CFA (color filter array)
interpolation within digital cameras [3]. Therefore, all the
resulting images with size of 512 × 512 were regarded as
original images. Please note that just gray scale images are
considered in our experiments in this paper. We can obtain
similar results for color images when performing the proposed
strategy on the illumination channel of color images based on
our experiments.
In each of the following experiments, we used the ensemble
classifier [51] with its default settings for classification. All
the images were randomly divided into two categories: 50%
was used for training and the rest for testing. We repeat the
training and testing 10 times and show the average results in
subsection IV-A and IV-B.
A. Exposing image processing operations
In this subsection, we use the proposed strategy to detect
various image processing operations. Both binary classification
(see 1)) and multi-class classification (see 2)) are considered.
1) Detection of a single operation: In this subsection, we
try to determine whether or not a questionable image has
been previously subject to a given image processing operation,
including spatial enhancement, lossy compression, filtering
and so on. The parameters of these operations are shown in
Table III.
For each original image, we created 11 counterparts using a
random parameter selected in Table III for each operation. Two
steganalytic features are employed in the proposed strategy,
i.e., SRM [39] and LBP [45]4. Besides, six state-of-the-art
forensic features including CE [8], CEBF [9], AR [15], GLF
[16], PPI [11], JPA [6] and their combined version (denote
as “Combined”) were included for comparative studies. For
4We use these two feature sets with their default parameters as introduced
in [39] and [45], so the dimensions of them are 34671 and 22153, respectively.
8TABLE IV
AVERAGE DETECTION ACCURACIES(%) FOR IDENTIFYING THE ORIGINAL IMAGES AND THE IMAGES AFTER A GIVEN TYPE OF IMAGE PROCESSING
OPERATION. THE BEST RESULTS IN EACH CASE ARE MARKED WITH BOLD FONT, AND THE UNDERLINED RESULTS DENOTE THE ACCURACIES USING THE
SPECIFIC METHODS TO DETECT THE CORRESPONDING OPERATION.
GC HE UM MeanF GF MedF WF Sca Rot JPEG JP2
CE 97.67 99.52 55.39 65.14 62.17 78.96 65.63 56.05 54.56 54.78 53.33
CEBF 95.25 98.70 50.07 50.16 50.06 52.81 50.04 50.08 50.04 50.17 50.05
AR 52.67 64.74 64.25 93.87 91.53 90.68 72.41 69.17 77.69 61.80 57.92
GLF 89.32 99.55 93.58 99.98 99.97 99.98 99.88 81.18 93.93 90.65 93.74
PPI 50.48 53.04 50.13 52.71 52.64 57.69 61.94 91.34 90.86 84.46 85.18
JPA 54.73 67.68 71.65 97.03 97.80 88.18 95.26 69.83 64.61 96.25 70.40
Combined 98.42 99.96 93.96 99.98 99.98 99.98 99.91 93.09 97.55 97.82 93.76
SRM 98.05 99.97 99.35 100 100 100 100 97.99 99.95 97.78 99.95
LBP 90.96 99.42 97.60 99.99 99.99 100 99.99 96.33 99.95 97.76 99.53
Combined without PPI 98.40 99.94 93.98 99.98 99.98 99.96 99.91 82.19 94.58 97.79 93.78
TABLE V
CONFUSION MATRIX FOR IDENTIFYING THE TYPES OF OPERATIONS USING THE SRM FEATURES [39]. PLEASE NOTE THAT THE ASTERISK “∗” HERE
DENOTES THAT THE CORRESPONDING ACCURACY IS LESS THAN 1%.
Actual\Predicted Orig GC HE UM MeanF GF MedF WF Sca Rot JPEG JP2
Orig 97.57 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 1.05 ∗ ∗ ∗
GC 2.86 96.37 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
HE ∗ ∗ 99.56 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
UM ∗ ∗ ∗ 99.11 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
MeanF ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 99.23 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
GF ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 99.69 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
MedF ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 99.90 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
WF ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 1.39 ∗ ∗ 98.53 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Sca 3.13 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 96.17 ∗ ∗ ∗
Rot ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 99.25 ∗ ∗
JPEG 4.04 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 95.67 ∗
JP2 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 99.84
TABLE VI
CONFUSION MATRIX FOR IDENTIFYING THE TYPES OF OPERATIONS USING THE LBP FEATURES [45]. PLEASE NOTE THAT THE ASTERISK “∗” HERE
DENOTES THAT THE CORRESPONDING ACCURACY IS LESS THAN 1%.
Actual\Predicted Orig GC HE UM MeanF GF MedF WF Sca Rot JPEG JP2
Orig 92.84 3.19 ∗ 1.93 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 1.51 ∗ ∗ ∗
GC 13.56 83.14 1.19 1.40 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
HE ∗ 1.33 98.44 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
UM 2.12 ∗ ∗ 96.60 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
MeanF ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 99.25 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
GF ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 99.75 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
MedF ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 99.75 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
WF ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 1.74 ∗ ∗ 98.13 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Sca 5.30 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 93.20 ∗ ∗ ∗
Rot ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 1.50 98.42 ∗ ∗
JPEG 3.78 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 95.60 ∗
JP2 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 99.03
each operation, therefore, we trained totally 9 classifiers cor-
responding to 9 different feature sets, where each classifier was
trained with the feature vectors extracted from the manipulated
images and the corresponding original images in the training
category. Finally, we used the trained classifiers to predict
class labels for the testing images and obtained the detection
accuracies.
The average detection accuracies are shown in Table IV.
It is observed that SRM [39] and LBP [45] usually perform
the best or nearly the best in all cases, indicating that both
the steganalytic features are very useful for detecting different
operations. For the six specific forensic methods, although
their detection performances for the corresponding operations
are good (see the underlined values in Table IV), their perfor-
mances are rather poor for other operations. For instance, the
method AR [15] can effectively detect the median filtering,
Gaussian filtering and mean filtering with accuracies larger
than 90%, while it fails to detect Gamma correction and
the corresponding accuracy drops to 52.67%, which is very
close to the random guessing. Please note that the combined
features provide quite satisfactory results in this experiment.
However, such combined features are still regarded as targeted
features, since when an image with a new operation is tested,
the corresponding features about the new operation has to
be carefully designed and added. Otherwise, the performance
for the new operation would be very poor. To validate this
issue, we have tested another set of combined features which
consists of five aforementioned forensic features without PPI
9TABLE VII
CONFUSION MATRIX FOR IDENTIFYING THE TYPES OF OPERATIONS USING THE SIX COMBINED FEATURES. PLEASE NOTE THAT THE ASTERISK “∗” HERE
DENOTES THAT THE CORRESPONDING ACCURACY IS LESS THAN 1%.
Actual\Predicted Orig GC HE UM MeanF GF MedF WF Sca Rot JPEG JP2
Orig 86.45 ∗ ∗ 5.54 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.54 1.47 ∗ 1.00
GC 2.06 93.86 2.17 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
HE ∗ 2.05 97.95 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
UM 5.95 ∗ ∗ 92.80 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
MeanF ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 88.94 6.84 ∗ 3.23 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
GF ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 6.83 90.91 ∗ 1.12 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
MedF ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 97.18 1.83 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
WF ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.75 1.22 1.87 91.37 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1.20
Sca 7.54 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 76.16 13.49 ∗ ∗
Rot 2.25 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 16.99 79.59 ∗ ∗
JPEG 3.67 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 94.59 ∗
JP2 10.72 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 1.76 ∗ ∗ 84.48
TABLE VIII
AVERAGE ACCURACIES (%) ALONG THE DIAGONAL DIRECTION IN THE CORRESPONDING CONFUSION MATRIX.
Features CE CEBF AR GLF PPI JPA Combined SRM LBP
Accuracy 27.00 17.78 35.84 79.91 19.60 30.40 89.52 98.41 96.18
TABLE IX
THE CLASSIFICATION ACCURACIES FOR DETECTING ANTI-FORENSICS OF JPEG COMPRESSION.
QF 75 80 85 90 95 Random
dither
Method [27] 88.83 87.81 86.47 84.79 58.50 74.46
1st detector [29] 83.38 80.74 76.49 68.59 55.64 69.76
2nd detector [29] 98.89 97.94 93.75 91.91 85.70 89.55
SRM 99.95 99.90 99.85 99.77 99.34 96.38
SPAM 97.92 97.28 96.30 94.51 90.37 88.50
dither Method [27] 49.99 50.00 49.99 49.99 50.00 50.001st detector [29] 60.08 60.42 60.87 61.10 61.47 60.73
& 2nd detector [29] 76.13 71.99 67.76 62.87 54.76 63.72
deblocking SRM 99.99 99.98 99.99 99.98 99.99 99.97SPAM 99.81 99.78 99.78 99.77 99.77 99.78
(the feature for resampling detection). We show the detection
results in the last row of Table IV. As expected, the accuracies
for detecting resampling become obviously poor compared to
that of the combined version with six features, especially for
scaling, the decrement is over 10% in this case. It is also
noted that the accuracies for detecting other operations are
nearly unchanged, since only the PPI feature is excluded. In
contrast, the steganalytic features would not change at all even
when new image operations are considered.
2) Identifying the type of various operations: In this sub-
section, we try to identify the type of several possible image
processing previously used for a given questionable image.
All types of operations listed in Table III are considered
in this experiment, i.e., this experiment involves a 12-class
classification problem. The test images were created similarly
as described in subsection IV-A using the parameters randomly
selected in Table III.
We also evaluated the proposed scheme with SRM [39] and
LBP [45]. The confusion matrices are shown in Table V and
Table VI, respectively. It is observed that both steganalytic
features can effectively identify the type of operation for a
given image, especially the SRM [39]. On average, the detec-
tion accuracies averaging along the diagonal direction in the
two confusion matrices are 98.41% and 96.18%, respectively.
For comparative study, we show the confusion matrix for
the combined features (which work the best among special
features in binary classification as shown in Table IV) in
Table VII, and show the average results along the diagonals
of confusion matrices for all the tested features in Table
VIII. From the two tables, it is observed that the detection
performances of most targeted methods are rather poor. Even
the combined features can obtain satisfactory results, it still
obviously poorer than ours with the average accuracy lower
than 90%.
B. Exposing anti-forensic operations
In this subsection, we apply the proposed strategy to ex-
posing four existing typical anti-forensic operations. In the
following, the experimental results for detecting each opera-
tion are firstly shown, and then a discussion on the universality
of the proposed strategy is given.
1) Detecting anti-forensics of JPEG compression: In this
experiment, we firstly JPEG compressed the original images
using six quality factors (QF) (the first five QF are ranging
from 75 to 95 with a step of 5, while the remaining one is
randomly selected between 75 and 99), and obtained totally
six categories of JPEG images, then we decompressed them
into the spatial domain. Finally we performed the two anti-
forensic operations described in [21] (namely, adding dithers
to DCT coefficients and reducing the blocking artifacts after
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TABLE X
THE CLASSIFICATION ACCURACIES FOR DETECTING ANTI-FORENSICS OF
CONTRAST ENHANCEMENT
γ 0.6 0.8 1.2 1.6 Random
Method [23] SRM 91.36 89.41 87.87 90.69 86.72SPAM 86.63 84.37 82.84 86.63 82.19
Method [24] SRM 87.75 79.15 73.53 87.82 72.99SPAM 84.15 75.10 70.44 84.93 69.83
TABLE XI
THE CLASSIFICATION ACCURACIES FOR DETECTING ANTI-FORENSICS OF
RESAMPLING #1: SCALING
s 0.6 0.8 1.2 1.6 Random
Median SRM 100 99.99 100 100 100SPAM 100 99.99 99.99 99.99 99.99
Edge SRM 99.82 99.98 99.99 100 99.71SPAM 96.58 99.67 99.92 99.97 97.64
Dual SRM 99.95 99.97 99.99 99.99 99.95SPAM 98.36 99.25 99.93 99.97 98.68
addition of dithers, denoted as “dither” and “dither & de-
blocking” for short) to obtain the resulting bitmap images
as positive instances, while the negative instances were the
original uncompressed images.
We adopted SRM and SPAM to differentiate the anti-
forensically modified images from the original ones. For com-
parative studies, the existing countering anti-forensic methods
[27], [29] were included. The experimental results are shown
in Table IX. Obviously, it is observed that the steganalytic
features can achieve very good performances with average
accuracy rates over 96%, which is much better than all
existing countering methods, especially for detecting “dither &
deblocking”. Note that the method proposed in [27] becomes
useless if removal of blocking artifacts is applied, since it only
tries to reveal the traces introduced by anti-forensic dithers.
2) Detecting anti-forensics of contrast enhancement: In
this experiment, we firstly enhanced the contrast of each
original image via Gamma correction with 5 parameters
(γ = 0.6, 0.8, 1.2, 1.6, and one randomly selected from 0.5 to
2.0 excluding 1.0), and then we respectively performed the two
anti-forensic methods [23] and [24] on the resulting images to
obtain the test images as positive instances. In this case, the
negative instances were the original images without contrast
enhancement.
The experimental results are shown in Table X. Two obser-
vations can be obtained from Table X. First, compared with
Cao’s method [23], Kwok’s method [24] is more difficult to
be detected, since Kwok’s method processes images like what
is done inside digital camera, thus leaving fewer detectable
artifacts. Second, when γ approaches to 1, the detection
performances are degraded. When the parameter γ is selected
randomly, the detection accuracies are not very satisfactory in
this case, especially for Kwok’s anti-forensic method. Please
note that none relative work has been proposed to detect anti-
forensics of contrast enhancement previously.
3) Detecting anti-forensics of resampling: In this experi-
ment, two kinds of resampling operations were investigated,
namely, scaling and rotation. The scaling factors used in the
TABLE XII
THE CLASSIFICATION ACCURACIES FOR DETECTING ANTI-FORENSICS OF
RESAMPLING #2: ROTATION
θ 10◦ 20◦ 30◦ 40◦ Random
Median SRM 100 99.99 99.99 99.99 99.99SPAM 99.99 100 99.99 100 99.99
Edge SRM 99.99 99.99 99.98 99.99 99.99SPAM 99.91 99.88 99.87 99.83 99.87
Dual SRM 99.97 99.98 99.99 99.98 99.97SPAM 99.83 99.87 99.88 99.86 99.85
TABLE XIII
THE CLASSIFICATION ACCURACIES FOR DETECTING ANTI-FORENSICS OF
MEDIAN FILTERING.
B = 4 B = 8 Random
T = 2 T = 4 T = 2 T = 4
Method [31] 99.91 99.90 99.97 99.95 99.91
SRM 100 99.99 100 99.99 100
SPAM 99.95 99.89 99.92 99.87 99.84
experiment were ranging from 0.6 to 1.8, and the rotation
angles were ranging from 10◦ to 40◦ with a step 10◦. The three
anti-forensic operations [25] (denoted as “Median”, “Edge”
and “Dual” for short) were applied to obtain the positive
instances, while the corresponding negative instances were the
original bitmaps without any resampling operation.
Table XI and XII show the experimental results for the
resampling cases of scaling and rotation, respectively. From
Table XI and XII, it is observed that the detection accuracies
are over 96.58% for all cases, achieving very good perfor-
mance.
4) Detecting anti-forensics of median filtering: In this ex-
periment, we firstly generated 10,000 median filtered images
with the filter size 3 × 3, and then the resulting images were
modified by the anti-forensic operation [26] with the parameter
B = {4, 8} and T = {2, 4}. In this situation, the positive
instances were the anti-forensically modified median filtered
images, while the negative instances were the original images
without median filtering. For a comparison, the recent work
(Zeng et al.’s method [31]) is included in this experiment.
The experimental results are shown in Table XIII. It is
observed that all the detection accuracies are higher than
99.8%, indicating that all these methods achieve very good
performance. Compared with the method [31], the proposed
scheme with SRM slightly outperforms it, while the proposed
scheme with SPAM can achieve almost the same performance
with [31] on average.
5) Discussions on the universality: From the results shown
above, we find that the proposed strategy can effectively
expose the images after the four different kinds of existing
anti-forensic operations using some typical universal stegan-
alytic features. On the other hand, it is expected that the
existing specific methods such as [27], [29], [31] would not
be effective for detecting other anti-forensic operations, since
their features are highly dependent on the special traces of
corresponding anti-forensic operations. To verify this issue,
we further use the specific methods [27], [29], [31] to detect
all the aforementioned anti-forensic operations.
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TABLE XIV
THE CLASSIFICATION ACCURACIES FOR DETECTING AFOREMENTIONED ANTI-FORENSIC OPERATIONS. THE BLUE TEXTS WITH UNDERLINES INDICATE
THE RESULTS USING THE SPECIFIC METHODS TO DETECT THEIR TARGETED OPERATIONS.
JPEG AF CE AF Resampling AF
MedF AFdither dither & Method Method median edge dualdeblocking [23] [24]
Method [27] 74.46 50.00 50.74 50.00 69.86 54.02 50.56 60.81
1st detector in [29] 69.76 60.73 49.95 54.58 93.39 57.43 63.64 63.01
2nd detector in [29] 89.55 63.72 49.98 51.06 59.23 53.94 51.78 74.07
Method [31] 69.42 50.77 49.71 50.27 51.26 51.22 51.23 99.91
SRM 96.38 99.97 86.72 72.99 99.99 99.85 99.96 100
SPAM 88.50 99.78 82.19 69.83 99.99 98.75 99.27 99.84
The experimental results are shown in Table XIV5. It is
observed that almost all existing specific methods fail to
detect other types of anti-forensic operations with an average
accurate of around 50%. There is an occasional exceptional
situation that the Lai’s 1st detector [29] can effectively iden-
tify anti-forensics of resampling with the “median” operation
(over 93%). The reason may be that the detector works by
measuring the strength of high frequency components, while
the “median” operation applies median filtering that would
suppress the high frequency components, which is just match
the features of Lai’s 1st detector. As a comparison, it can
be observed from the last two rows of Table XIV that the
proposed scheme with SRM and SPAM features achieves very
good performance in all the cases, meaning that this scheme
can be universally used for countering various anti-forensic
operations.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel strategy from the view
of steganalysis to detect various image operations, including
various common image processing and most existing anti-
forensic operations. The main contributions of the paper are
as follows:
• We analyze the common artifacts introduced by various
image operations, and show that some inherent correla-
tion among adjacent pixels within an original image is
difficult to be well preserved after any image operation,
especially when the modification rate is high.
• We analyze the similarity between image operations
(including various image processing and anti-forensic
operations) and steganography with detailed examples
and extensive quantitative data. Then we model the image
operations as data hiding and build a bridge between
digital image forensics and steganalysis.
• We adopt a strategy that applies steganalytic features
for detecting various image operations. The extensive
experiments show that the proposed strategy with some
advanced steganalytic features significantly outperforms
the existing targeted forensic methods in both effective-
ness and universality. Furthermore, multi-classification is
considered in our experiments.
5In Table XIV, “AF”, “MedF”, and “CE” denote “anti-forensics”, “median
filtering”, and “contrast enhancement”, respectively. Note that the results
for detecting anti-forensics of resampling are averaged on both resizing and
rotation operations.
What is more, this paper also provides some valuable
insights for both forensic investigator and forger. For the inves-
tigator, it is very effective to detect various image operations
with some advanced steganalytic features, and thus there is
no need to just consider the special artifacts introduced by a
given image operation as it did in previous forensic works. For
the forgers, they should not only try to remove the tampering
traces to resist the targeted detector, but also need to carefully
considered some inherent statistics within the original images
when performing any anti-forensic operation. Besides, the pro-
posed strategy is flexible. With the development on steganal-
ysis, more advanced high-dimensional steganalytic features in
the future can be directly used in the proposed strategy to
further improve the detection performances for exposing the
existing and new image operations. Our future efforts will also
be made to generalize the proposed strategy for small image
patches, so as to effectively detect local image manipulations.
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